

# ANNEX M

## ESF 13: PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY

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### **PROMULGATION STATEMENT**

Transmitted herewith is the ESF –13: Public Safety and Security Annex to the Caddo Parish Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). This annex supersedes any previous Annex promulgated for this purpose. It provides a framework in which Caddo Parish and its political subdivisions can plan and perform their respective functions during an emergency when EOC activation is necessary.

This annex is in accordance with existing federal, state, and local statutes and understandings of the various departments/agencies involved. It has been concurred by the Caddo Parish Sheriff's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP), Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. All recipients of this annex are requested to advise Caddo Parish OHSEP as to changes that might result in its improvement or increase its usefulness.

This annex will be annually reviewed by the Caddo Parish OHSEP Deputy Director.

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## ESF-13: Public Safety and Security

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### **I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

This annex provides for the proper coordination of law enforcement activities in order to insure the safety of life and property during emergency situations. It assigns responsibilities and provides coordination between the law enforcement agencies operating during emergencies.

### **II. SITUATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS**

This section of the law enforcement annex identifies broad considerations that must be addressed before developing a specific emergency law enforcement annex. The situational projections identify disaster circumstances for which the community must plan. The assumptions, in turn, address the unknowns of the disaster projections. Although assumptions cannot be validated, a lack of assessment can influence the successful execution of the law enforcement program during an emergency. Assumptions define the scope of the resource base that a community must provide to meet its emergency obligations under disaster conditions.

#### **A. Situation**

During emergencies law enforcement agencies must expand their operations to provide the increased protection required by disaster conditions. Numerous federal, state and parish law enforcement agencies are available to support local law enforcement agencies within Caddo Parish.

#### **B. Assumptions**

Activities of local law enforcement agencies will increase significantly during emergency operations. Adequate law enforcement resources and services will often be available through existing mutual-aid agreements. If local capabilities are overtaxed, support will be obtained from state and federal law enforcement agencies.

### **III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

The following sections of this annex first outline general law enforcement responsibilities and then detail specific operational requirements. In order to give some context to these operational considerations, they are organized according to the four phases of emergency management - mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

#### **A. General**

1. Emergency operations for law enforcement agencies will simply be an expansion of their normal daily responsibilities. These responsibilities include maintenance of law and order, traffic control, and crowd control. A provision must also be made to provide security to other public safety elements of local government. Local agencies will have the responsibility for routine law enforcement and support groups will assist

- in traffic and crowd control.
2. When an emergency is declared and this plan is implemented and the EOC is activated, the Sheriff/Police Chief and/or his designated representative will report to the EOC; other supervisors will operate from their normally assigned duty area.
  3. During the threat or existence of a nuclear attack or other national security emergency and/or disaster, the Sheriff/Police Chief and/or their designated representatives will coordinate law enforcement activities with other parish agencies from the EOC. The preservation of manpower resources will be paramount in pre-disaster and post-attack planning. The ability of law enforcement to provide necessary service is based upon their ability and capability to survive. The on-call personnel, who must seek the nearest shelter at the outset of the emergency for their own safety, will report their location to their command, if possible, and proceed to their normal duty area as soon as safety conditions permit.
  4. The call-up of law enforcement personnel will be in accordance with prescribed departmental/agency policy. The Sheriff and/or Police Chief will assign the operational priorities for their personnel. All personnel will report to their pre-designated locations unless otherwise directed by their supervisor at the time they are notified of the emergency. Pre-designation of duties and responsibilities will facilitate a reduction in response time.
  5. Law enforcement agencies will establish inner and outer perimeters to secure a disaster scene. A strict policy of limited access to the disaster area will be rigidly enforced to ensure the safety and well being of the community. All movement into and out of the area will be requested through the established command post.

## **B. Phases of Emergency Management**

1. **Mitigation (Prevention)**
  - a. Analyze hazards and determine law enforcement requirements.
  - b. Identify agencies, organizations, military, and local citizens capable of providing support services.
  - c. Plan and train personnel for maximum use of available law enforcement resources.
  - d. Identify key and critical facilities requiring special security during an emergency.
  - e. Develop (as needed), review and update law enforcement plans and standard operating guidelines (SOGs) at least annually.
  - f. Coordinate law enforcement capabilities with neighboring jurisdictions.
2. **Preparedness**
  - a. Develop law enforcement plans and standard operating guidelines (SOGs).

- b. Prepare plans for traffic control during emergencies.
- c. Prepare contingency plans for anticipated situations.
- d. Arrange training programs for law enforcement staff, including reserve, auxiliary and/or volunteer personnel.
- e. Prepare plans to care for families of law enforcement personnel under emergency conditions while personnel are on duty.
- f. Participate in the development and implementation of emergency preparedness exercises.
- g. Participate in the development of an emergency services' Incident Command System (ICS).

### **3. Response**

- a. Maintain law and order.
- b. Provide mobile units (patrol cars) to assist with warning functions as coordinated by the EOC (See Annex C – Warning).
- c. Report observed damage.
- d. Coordinate with EOC to ensure its security and to control traffic around the facility.
- e. Coordinate with EOC to ensure security and to control traffic around shelter sites.
- f. Coordinate with EOC to control traffic for evacuations.
- g. Patrol evacuated areas.
- h. Provide security for critical facilities and resources.
- i. Provide crowd and traffic control in specified areas.
- j. Issue passes to personnel authorized to enter restricted area.
- k. Request support forces as necessary.
- l. Provide security for evacuation prisoners from jails and prisons, as well as for relocation and housing of prisoners in an emergency, if necessary.
- m. Maintain records of all financial expenditures and use of law enforcement resources.
- n. Provide support for radiological defense activities as requested by the EOC (See Annex F – Radiological Defense).
- o. Supervise all reserve, auxiliary and/or volunteer forces' police work.
- p. Seal off disaster areas. Establish crime scene investigation and secure evident if disaster appears to be a result of criminal activity.
- q. Redirect traffic around affected areas.
- r. Provide for assistance in disseminating warnings to the public.
- s. Provide for assistance in evacuation and/or movement to shelters.
- t. Provide for law enforcement in reception centers, shelters and other areas.

### **4. Recovery**

- a. Continue emergency law enforcement services as long as necessary.
- b. Phase down operations as coordinated with the EOC.
- c. Assist in damage assessment activities.

- d. Return mutual-aid and augmentation forces to home jurisdictions as soon as possible.

### **C. Execution**

1. When the EOC is activated, the Sheriff and/or Police Chief will ensure that a law enforcement representative is present in the EOC to coordinate field operations with other EOC representatives and agencies.
2. Overall law enforcement responsibilities are outlined in paragraph III, section B, above.
3. Coordination among law enforcement agencies is necessary to ensure emergency operational readiness. Each department/agency in Caddo Parish having responsibility for emergency management activities should develop operating instructions and resource listings to support this plan. Instructions should include concepts to provide for vacated risk area property and population, essential organizations, prisoners, relocated population, and congregate care (shelter) facilities in their respective jurisdictions.

## **IV. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES**

This section of the law enforcement annex takes the operational considerations and recasts them as specific duties and responsibilities for designated local government and support agencies. Making these assignments is critical because confusion during an emergency could have serious consequences. The task assignments detailed below are extensive, but certainly not exhaustive. Items may be added, deleted or changed as deemed necessary at the time of the particular emergency.

### **A. General Organization**

The organization of law enforcement agencies in Caddo Parish facilitates the effective coordination and control of like and complementary support activities. The organizational structure reflected in Appendix 1 to this annex readily identifies the positions and relationships of all essential services.

### **B. Assignment of Responsibilities**

#### **1. Caddo Parish Sheriff's Office**

- a. Oversee and coordinate all law enforcement activities at the parish level.
- b. Maintain law and order.
- c. Secure key facilities.
- d. Provide law enforcement communications capabilities.
- e. Develop plans for traffic and crowd control.
- f. Coordinate with other levels of government for law enforcement support and mutual-aid assistance during emergency response activities.
- g. Staff the EOC operations and communications center on a 24-hour basis or as needed.
- h. Assist in disseminating warnings to the public.

- i. Assist in evacuation and/or movement to shelters.
- j. Coordinate evacuation of incarcerated individuals.

**2. Municipal Police Departments**

- a. Maintain law and order.
- b. Provide mobile units for warning operations.
- c. Secure key facilities.
- d. Provide law enforcement communications capabilities.
- e. Develop plans for traffic and crowd control.
- f. Coordinate with other levels of government for law enforcement support and mutual-aid assistance during emergency response activities.
- g. Staff the EOC operations and communications center on a 24-hour basis or as needed.
- h. Assist in disseminating warnings to the public.
- i. Assist in evacuation and/or movement to shelters.
- j. Coordinate evacuation of incarcerated individuals.

**3. Louisiana State Police – Troop G**

- a. Monitor NAWAS as the primary warning point.
- b. Provide traffic control on state roads.
- c. Perform normal law enforcement activities.
- d. Limit ingress into affected areas to authorized personnel.
- e. Provide support to local operations as needed.

**4. Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries**

- a. Perform normal law enforcement activities.
- b. Provide support for local operations as needed.

**5. Military Support**

- a. Support local law enforcement agencies, when authorized.
- b. Provide resources for law enforcement activities.
- c. Assist in evacuation operations.
- d. Support RADEF operations.

**6. Local/State Public Works and Highway Departments**

Responsible for positioning traffic control devices (i.e. barricades, detour signs, etc.) per law enforcement instructions.

**V. DIRECTION AND CONTROL**

This section of the annex explains the overall emergency management considerations of various law enforcement agencies within Caddo Parish.

- 1. Local governments are responsible for coordinating law enforcement activities within their jurisdictions.
- 2. The Sheriff and/or Police Chief or his/her designated representative will

- serve as the law enforcement coordinator within the EOC.
3. Routine law enforcement activities will be conducted according to standard operating guidelines (SOGs) from usual locations when possible. The EOC law enforcement coordinator(s) will set priorities for resources and coordinate activities of the various forces. Primary and alternate operations sites for law enforcement agencies within Caddo Parish are on file at the EOC.
  4. Mutual-aid forces will function under the supervision of their supervisors. Coordination of their use will be directed by the chief law enforcement official at the EOC in the jurisdiction in which they are operating.
  5. Auxiliary, reserve and volunteer forces will work under the supervision of the chief law enforcement official in the jurisdiction to which they are sent or activated.
  6. Supporting military forces will work under the direct supervision of their superiors but will serve at the direction of the chief law enforcement official of the jurisdiction to which they are sent.

## **VI. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT**

1. Lines of succession to all key positions within the law enforcement chain of command will follow pertinent state and local laws and departmental standard operating guidelines (SOGs).
2. All law enforcement agencies will designate and be prepared to equip and staff alternate command posts. Copies of these alternate operations sites will be kept on file at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

## **VII. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS**

This section of the law enforcement annex addresses management and administrative needs, general support requirements and the availability of services. Specific areas outlined here are addressed in more detail in state and local laws (i.e., the Louisiana Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act of 1993) and departmental standard operating guidelines (SOGs).

### **I. Administrative**

Law enforcement agencies will develop procedures for the timely submission of required reports and records as prescribed in departmental standard operating guidelines (SOGs). Records are required to establish historical data and to substantiate reimbursement requests.

### **II. Emergency Authority**

Emergency authority granted to law enforcement officials will be as prescribed in the Louisiana Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act of 1993 and local ordinances.

### **III. Communications**

Law enforcement agencies will make maximum use of available communications resources. In addition to providing telephone communications



in the EOC, the need to augment existing radio communications with Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) groups and other communications organizations must be given high priority.

#### **IV. Security**

Law enforcement agencies will provide security for the EOC and all restricted areas. Individuals conducting Entry Controller (EC) duties for the EOC are permitted to allow entry based on personal recognition. If visitor(s) is not personally recognized, they will need to provide picture ID so the EC can check with authorized persons in the EOC who may subsequently “vouch” the visitor into the EOC if their authority to enter can be verified. Caddo OHSEP personnel will inform the EC who has vouching privileges.

Law enforcement agencies are responsible for developing and issuing badges and passes for restricted disaster areas as necessary. Experience has proven that there are cases where special passes are needed in a disaster area. If discretion and common sense are not used, a community can become paralyzed with over-enforcement, or disaster relief can be seriously hampered with under-enforcement. Only under extraordinary circumstances will passes be required after a disaster. The decision to require passes rests upon the executive branch of local government, and law enforcement agencies will be responsible for issuing passes upon the direction of the EOC. A sample, temporary pass, is shown in Appendix 3.

The following vehicles and their occupants are exempt from pass requirements: Marked utility company vehicles (power, phone, gas companies, etc.), military and government vehicles, marked city and parish vehicles (water, sewer, trucks, etc.), relief agencies (Red Cross, Salvation Army, etc.). Common sense dictates that many emergency passes are already in existence (press cards, medical personnel, etc.). These passes will be honored, unless a reasonable question arises as to their authenticity. If such questions should arise, the party should be routed to the nearest law enforcement agency and considered for a temporary pass. Also refer to traffic movement and control plan in Annex A – ESF-1 Transportation.

#### **V. Media Relations**

All press releases will be coordinated with EOC. Media access will be restricted, when deemed necessary. Press conference security will be ensured. Also, Reference Annex O – ESF #15 Emergency Public Information.

#### **VI. Reports and Records**

Increased readiness reports will be forwarded to the Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) prior to the disaster. Initial disaster reports will be faxed to GOHSEP at the immediate onset of the disaster. Operational situation reports will be faxed to GOHSEP on a regular basis for the duration of the disaster.

## **VII. Resources**

A complete listing of all resources available in the respective jurisdiction will be prepared by each law enforcement agency. This listing will be compiled in the EOC and used as the basis for allocating resources, determining security needs for key facilities, and establishing priorities. Also, reference Annex G - ESF #7 Resource Support.

## **VIII. Key Facilities**

Key facilities are kept on file at the EOC. Security will be provided for key facilities during emergency situations.

## **IX. Training**

Training programs will be developed, performed and supervised by law enforcement training officers.

## **VIII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE**

It is the responsibility of each law enforcement agency to insure its own operational capabilities. The sheriffs and police chiefs in Caddo Parish will coordinate the planning of all law enforcement operations related to emergency preparedness. The sheriff's offices and police departments for their respective jurisdiction will maintain standard operating guidelines (SOGs) for all law enforcement agencies. The sheriffs and police chiefs or their designees will be responsible for periodically reviewing, updating exercising, modifying, accepting, and approving the law enforcement annex.

## **IX. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES**

### **A. LEGAL AUTHORITY**

See Basic Plan.

### **B. REFERENCES**


1. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Disaster Operations. CPG 1-6. Washington: FEMA, 1981.
2. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Local Government Emergency Planning. CPG 1-8. Washington: FEMA, 1982.

## **X. APPENDICES TO ANNEX M**

1. Law Enforcement Organizational Chart
2. Terrorism Plan
3. Temporary Pass Sample
4. Law Enforcement Agencies
5. Law Enforcement Resources
6. Civil Disturbances
7. Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs)

## Appendix 1 – Organizational Chart

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## Appendix 2 – Terrorism Plan

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The purpose of this annex is to provide a framework for the coordination of parish, local and outside resources in dealing with terrorist threats and incidents. Local government authorities will endeavor to control and minimize potential effects of such incidents on the public, while acquiring and preserving the information needed to bring the terrorist(s) to justice.

The response to these life-threatening incidents will be the responsibility of local law enforcement agencies. Considering the sensitive nature of the management of such incidents, specific response procedures will not be published in this appendix. Each agency listed in this annex will develop its own Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) and distribute this information to its own personnel. A copy should also be maintained in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The specific response is not a concern for the purposes of this appendix. The major emphasis of this appendix will be to provide local authorities and emergency planners with options to consider when dealing with terrorist threats and incidents, and focus on support that may be requested from multiple departments of local government under such conditions.

### **I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS**

#### **A. Situation**

1. A terrorist incident is defined as: “A violent act, or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States, or of any State, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.
2. Caddo Parish, including local municipalities, have high vulnerability targets for terrorists. The targets include symbolic structures such as government buildings, public works facilities, roads, bridges, drainage and flood control structures, utilities, industrial installations that have hazardous materials, transportation installations such as Shreveport Regional Airport, military targets such as Barksdale Air Force Base, and periodic gatherings of large numbers of people for various events.
3. The parish and local governments have a limited number of law enforcement and public safety personnel. It is not possible to guard all buildings, installations and crowds that might become terrorist targets.
4. Since a terrorist(s) can choose his targets and the time and method of his attacks, advance knowledge of such attacks is not going to be available on a regular basis. When such information is available, it will be disseminated through law enforcement channels, and it will be handled with care so that it remains secure.
5. A terrorist(s) will choose targets in order to satisfy his own motives and time schedules. A frequent motive for terrorist action is to attract the attention of news media by committing a crime that is outrageous, either by the target that is attacked, or by the number of deaths, injuries and

damages inflicted. The posture of the government must, therefore, be loose and flexible.

6. Terrorist Incident Program (TIP) management consists of two components, Crisis Management and Consequence Management. The Crisis Management Component (CRIMCO) will consist of all intelligence and law enforcement activities. The Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the affected jurisdiction (i.e., Sheriff for the parish and/or Police Chief for municipalities) is in charge of CRIMCO activities. The Consequence Management Component (COMCO) will consist of all search and rescue, firefighting, evacuation, shelter, medical and other associated activities. The Parish President and/or Mayor of the affected jurisdiction have authority for all COMCO activities, and may delegate the immediate response to the Director of the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. Such specialized activities as hazardous materials response may fall under either component as the situation dictates.

#### **B. Assumptions**

1. It may not be possible to get advanced information or intelligence about terrorist attacks, and any such information may be kept in law enforcement channels for security reasons.
2. If any intelligence information is given to the emergency preparedness community, it will probably only be released at the last possible moment, and the warning information may not be as specific or reliable.
3. The need for security for intelligence information may hinder attempts to preposition emergency response agencies or to give timely warning to people in the target area. This will result in a situation like that in a tornado, of little or no advanced warning, followed by sudden devastation. The potential for casualties in such a situation will be high.
4. When a terrorist incident, such as a bombing, takes place, the terrorist(s) may plant secondary explosive or other types of devices to go off when responders arrive at the scene, thus targeting the response people themselves. Responders will need to check the scene carefully for secondary devices.
5. NOTE: Response personnel should be alert to the possibility of secondary explosive devices at suspected terrorist incidents.
6. When a terrorist incident has taken place, there will be a need to rescue injured people, recover bodies, demolish unsafe structures and preserve the crime scene elements that will be needed to trace the terrorist(s) and/or construct a chain of evidence for the terrorist(s) trail. These needs may conflict. When they do conflict, the grounds of the conflict will be explained and referred to higher authority. In the case of a conflict among local and state or federal authorities, the conflict will be referred to the Governor.

## **II. CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS**

Terrorist incident preparations and emergency operations of local/parish

government will take place within the framework of the Four Phases of Emergency Management: Mitigation, Preparedness, Response and Recovery.

**A. Mitigation (Prevention)**

The Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP), the Louisiana State Police (LSP) and other concerned agencies will coordinate continuing educational programs for government, business and concerned citizens, to enhance awareness. The Caddo Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness will encourage people in key positions to attend such programs as they are announced. Caddo OHSEP, along with local emergency services, will circulate awareness materials to key people, and conduct audits and inspections of possible target sites as requested, to heighten awareness.

**B. Preparedness**

1. This annex, its implementing procedures, and other related directives, papers and documents will be maintained, reviewed and updated as needed. All such papers will use the concept of Incident Command System (ICS) for responding to terrorist incidents.
2. Caddo OHSEP will initiate such memoranda of agreement as are needed to insure close cooperation with other concerned jurisdictions, organizations and parties.
3. Caddo OHSEP will insure that TIP materials and concepts are included in the regular emergency preparedness training and exercise schedule.
4. Caddo OHSEP will ensure that procedures exist to direct any advanced knowledge of terrorist incidents to law enforcement channels in order that actions may be taken to prevent the incidents and apprehend the terrorist(s). Such information will be safeguarded according to the instructions of the CRIMCO. Based on the type of terrorist threat affecting the Caddo area, CRIMCO will determine what TIP information can be released to Caddo OHSEP for the purposes of planning and mitigation. Once provided TIP information, Caddo OHSEP will convene and determine the need to implement appropriate Terrorist Threat Level measures according to the Homeland Security Advisory System.
5. Caddo OHSEP, through the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), will ensure that chains of communication are opened and kept open among local, parish and state law enforcement authorities to ensure that TIP information is handled expeditiously and securely.
6. In cases in which advanced TIP information is received by Law Enforcement authorities, efforts will be made to weigh the need for secrecy versus the need for public safety and preparedness. It is likely that only "general" threat information would be permitted released to the general public in the interest of both stemming unnecessary alarm and aiding authorities in capturing terrorists/criminal suspects.

**C. Response**

1. If advance warning is received and appropriate Terrorist Threat Levels are implemented, some response agencies may be able to pre-stage people and equipment, and reduce the overall response time and associated vulnerabilities.
2. All response activities will be conducted according to the Incident Command System (ICS).
3. When the potential or actual impact of the incident is great, or the threat is great, the Mayor and/or Parish President may declare a State-of-Emergency, and mobilize all local resources to deal with the threat. If the threat is too great to be handled by local resources, the State will be requested to support the TIP operations.
4. Caddo OHSEP will activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to coordinate COMCO (search & rescue, firefighting, evacuation, shelter, medical and other associated activities). Law enforcement authorities will establish a Law Enforcement Operations Center (LEOC) at which all CRIMCO (intelligence and law enforcement) activities will be coordinated. The two centers may be located together. A city and/or parish government representative will be sent to the LEOC, and a law enforcement representative will be sent to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), to ensure that operations are coordinated.

**D. Recovery**

Recovery as used in this appendix, will mean the return of all operations to normal. Recovery operations will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Caddo Emergency Operations Plan and the LA Disaster Recovery Manual.

**III. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES**

**A. Mayor and/or Parish President**

1. Issue a local State-of-Emergency as appropriate, and request assistance from the State as needed. NOTE: This must be coordinated through Caddo OHSEP and forwarded to the GOHSEP pursuant to the LA Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act of 1993.
2. Direct preparedness (i.e., HSAS increased threat level implementation), response and recovery activities with EOC staff.

**B. Law Enforcement**

1. Control and coordinate all TIP law enforcement activities in their respective jurisdiction. Develop and maintain procedures to support this plan, including procedures for obtaining, processing and safeguarding TIP information. Provide Caddo OHSEP recommendations on release of TIP information to the general public and implementation of appropriate Terrorist Threat Levels (HSAS).
2. Maintain continuing TIP liaison with other law enforcement authorities



in the local jurisdiction and neighboring parishes, and with the Louisiana State Police (LSP). Maintain liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other federal law enforcement authorities that have offices in the local jurisdiction.

3. When a suspected terrorist incident takes place, carry out all CRIMCO activities, such as securing of a perimeter around the site, and having the area searched for possible secondary explosive devices that might have been placed to target responders. If law enforcement personnel are first on the scene, proceed with lifesaving activities, including search and rescue, and evacuation. Coordinate activities with fire service, medical and other emergency service response agencies and personnel. If law enforcement personnel are trained and equipped for bomb disposal, deal with any unexploded devices and/or substance.
4. Prevent debris clearance until debris has been examined for possible evidence of a crime, except where debris clearance is immediately necessary for rescue operations. Establish an LEOC at the scene, and prepare for possible establishment of a Federal Joint Operations Center (JOC).
5. When a suspected terrorist incident takes place, call in the LSP and the FBI, and maintain contact with them in carrying out all CRIMCO activities.

**C. Caddo Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness**

1. Coordinate all COMCO activities that are not associated with the law enforcement aspects of the incident. Advise Caddo OHSEP on response and recovery efforts.
2. Activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and establish communications link with the on-scene command post. Assist the Incident Commander with requests for resources and support personnel and/or agencies. Coordinate requests for assistance from neighboring jurisdictions and the State. Coordinate with state and federal COMCO responders as needed.
3. When advanced warning is provided, the EOC will coordinate all approved Terrorist Threat Level (HSAS) countermeasures with agencies/facilities affected.

**D. Fire Services**

Conduct search and rescue, fire suppression and other activities as needed. Check for the presence of hazardous materials and take appropriate measures. In cases in which fire personnel have explosives training and expertise, deal with any unexploded devices. In some cases, fire department apparatus may be needed for a specific kind of response. High pressure or high volume hoses may be appropriate; police response teams may request use of an aerial platform truck to achieve a vantage point. A pumper truck may be requested to be on stand-by at the scene for use as a rescue vehicle and/or shielding device for law enforcement personnel. The location for

staging the equipment will be directed by the Incident Commander.

**E. Health and Medical Services**

1. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) will be involved if any injuries are incurred. EMS personnel will conduct lifesaving operations as appropriate. They will insure that casualties of explosions and hazardous materials incidents are decontaminated as soon as possible. An EMS unit may be requested to stand-by in close proximity to the scene to facilitate rapid response. The location for staging will be directed by the Incident Commander.
2. Public health and other health authorities will check for chemical and biological contamination, and insure that proper precautions are taken to render contaminated areas harmless. Note: Assistance may be obtained from local and state Haz/Mat response teams, LA DEQ and BAFB Command Post.
3. Hospitals and emergency services will insure that people who have been exposed to chemical and/or biological agents are decontaminated prior to entering emergency rooms and health care facilities, unless the facility has methods to deal with such exposures.

**F. Other Support**

Law enforcement officials at the scene may require other support resources (such as National Guard assistance). These requests should be made through the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Most state and federal resources cannot be utilized until local government has issued a State-of-Emergency, through the EOC.

**IV. DIRECTION AND CONTROL**

**A. CRIMCO**

All law enforcement and Crisis Management Component operations will be controlled and coordinated by local law enforcement.

**B. COMCO**

All normal emergency preparedness, response, recovery and COMCO activities will be controlled and coordinated in accordance with the Basic Plan, and Annex A - Emergency Operations Center.

**V. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT**

See Basic Plan.

**VI. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS**

The LEOC is the control point for CRIMCO operations. It will be set up and staffed by the appropriate local law enforcement office. It may be absorbed by a Joint Operations Center (JIC) if one is set up by federal authorities.

1. The Caddo EOC is the control point for COMCO operations, as

described in the Basic Plan. It will continue to function as long as COMCO operations are conducted. The Caddo Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will be activated in conjunction with a terrorist/sniper/hostage incident. The appropriate law enforcement agency should contact Caddo OHSEP to activate the EOC at 675-2255 (24 Hours). The EOC will be able to coordinate support resources (including shelters for evacuated individuals) leaving field personnel free to concentrate on the emergency at hand.

2. An on-scene Command Post will be set-up for the Incident Commander. It will function as long as needed.
3. All necessary records and reports will be maintained on each incident, for both the CRIMCO and COMCO operations.

## **VII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE**

1. The Caddo OHSEP Director, along with local law enforcement officials, is responsible for maintaining and updating this annex. Local law enforcement agencies will develop, coordinate and maintain Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) and mutual-aid agreements to support this annex.
2. Local law enforcement agencies are responsible for developing, coordinating and maintaining all CRIMCO procedures and mutual-aid agreements needed to support this annex.
3. Local law enforcement agencies will maintain more detailed standard operating guidelines (SOGs) for response to terrorist/sniper/hostage incidents than are included in this appendix. Law enforcement SOGs should use a format that will make it easy to find the information and guidance needed. There should be no confusion about coordinating the initial response. Directions should be very clear, even to someone not familiar with normal response to this type of emergency. Response plans should be kept simple, remembering that immediate concerns are the initial response steps and those elements that should not be overlooked during the response.

## **VIII. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES**

1. The Louisiana Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act of 1993, as amended.
2. The Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan.
3. The Louisiana Disaster Recovery Manual.
4. The Federal Response Plan, Terrorist Incident Annex.
5. The Caddo Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan.


## **IX. ATTACHMENTS TO APPENDIX 3**

1. CRIMCO Organizational Chart
2. COMCO Organizational Chart
3. Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)
4. Threat Countermeasures

5. Threat Level Matrix
6. Federal & State Assistance
7. Abbreviations/Definitions

## Appendix 2 – Attachment 2 – Consequence Management Component (COMCO) Organizational Chart

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## Appendix 2 – Attachment 3 – Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)

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### **I. GENERAL**

The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) describes a progressive level of protective postures that are structured to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts. Local planners develop specific procedures that may be implemented in response to progressive terrorist threats/actions. HSAS declarations will normally flow from federal authorities (i.e., U.S. Department of Homeland Security) based on a variety of intelligence sources. Once informed of a local threat and an alert level declaration, local authorities will determine what specific measures (see Threat Level Matrix) will be implemented in order to protect its citizens.

### **II. HSAS DEFINED**

#### **A. Green – Low Risk**

This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist attacks. Federal departments and agencies will consider the following protective measures: Refine and exercise prearranged protective measures; Ensure personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory System and specific prearranged department or agency protective measures; and Institute a process to assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

#### **B. Blue – General Risk**

This condition is declared when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the measures taken in the previous threat condition, federal departments and agencies will consider the following protective measures: Check communications with designated emergency response or command locations; Review and update emergency response procedures; and Provide the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act appropriately.

#### **C. Yellow – Elevated Risk**

An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the measures taken in the previous threat conditions, federal departments and agencies will consider the following protective measures: Increase surveillance of critical locations; Coordinate emergency plans with nearby jurisdictions as appropriate; Assess whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of prearranged protective measures; and Implement, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.

#### **D. Orange – High Black**

A High Condition is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the measures taken in the previous threat conditions, federal departments and agencies will consider the following protective measures: Coordinate necessary security efforts with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, National Guard or other security and armed forces; Take additional precautions at public events, possibly considering alternative venues or even cancellation; Prepare to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing the workforce; and Restrict access to a threatened facility to essential personnel only.

**E. Red – Severe Risk**

A Severe Condition reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. Under most circumstances, the protective measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time. In addition to the protective measures in the previous threat conditions, federal departments and agencies also will consider the following general measures: Increase or redirect personnel to address critical emergency needs; Assign emergency response personnel and pre-position and mobilize specially trained teams or resources; Monitor, redirect, or constrain transportation systems; and Close public and government facilities not critical for continuity of essential operations, especially public safety.

**III. HSAS ILLUSTRATION**





## Appendix 2 – Attachment 4 – Threat Countermeasures

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### **I. GENERAL**

Terrorism (actual or perceived) can cause a number of concerns for local planners/authorities. The purpose of these suggested countermeasures is to provide local authorities a platform in which to discuss and determine appropriate measures to implement based on the threat, associated risks, and impact on the local community. These suggested countermeasures are not to be considered inclusive, but should be used as a tool to stimulate thought and progressive reaction to credible threats. Many of the suggested measures under the HSAS will most likely cause a severe impact on local commerce and citizen's access to critical facilities. But it is important for local planners to understand increased threat levels are normally implemented for only short periods of time, whereas guarded or elevated levels could be implemented for extended periods of time without causing undo hardships. The key is for local planners/authorities to weigh and decide the associated risks against the impact on the local community. Countermeasures implemented should be based on all information, liaison with state and federal authorities, as tempered by best judgment and knowledge of the local situation.

### **II. THREAT LEVEL BLUE - GUARDED**

#### **A. Threat Awareness**

1. Verify source of threat information and local threat. Review the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), Annex T, to ensure local authorities understand the Terrorist Incident Program (TIP) and how the Crisis Management Component (CRIMCO) and the Consequence Management Component (COMCO) mitigate the threat/event.
2. Local Law Enforcement agencies will coordinate with state/federal authorities and determine what information, if anything, is releasable and advise Caddo OHSEP. Terrorist threat information is often classified and requires special handling (i.e., limited access) in order to help authorities identify and capture criminal suspects before they can do harm. Depending upon the type of threat and associated risks, law enforcement agencies may determine the release of limited information (i.e., general and non-specific) is in the best interest of public safety.
3. Determine local law enforcement issues/concerns based on the threat. Discuss local countermeasures and implement.
4. Review higher advisory levels and determine if additional countermeasures should be considered/implemented.

#### **B. Events/Entertainment**

1. Determine what major events (involving large numbers of people) are scheduled in the local area. Discuss concerns and determine

if existing safety/security standards (e.g., event security guards, identity checks, lighting, traffic control, etc.) require enhancement.

2. Obtain a 24-hour contact point for any major event. Ensure police department and EOC are advised who to contact in case of increased threat/emergency.

**C. Transportation/Traffic Control**

1. Discuss equipment (e.g., barriers, barricades, signs, etc.) and personnel needs for implementing a barrier plan that will prevent vehicle traffic/parking next to critical facilities. Develop plan for identifying such resources and locations considered “critical” and at risk based on the threat.
2. Ensure all major transportation facilities (e.g., air, rail, bus, port, etc.) are notified of security issues/concerns.

**D. Critical Facility Access/Control**

1. Identify which facilities in Caddo Parish are considered at risk based on the threat. Discuss countermeasures.
2. For each critical facility identified, advise facility manager/custodian to accomplish random external checks of their facilities and parking lots. Have them report anything out of the ordinary (e.g., abandoned vehicles, unattended packages, loitering personnel, etc.) to the police department.
3. Advise critical facility managers to have all deliveries verified outside their facility. A knowledgeable employee should verify the delivery is expected and that it comes from an authorized source. If in doubt, the employee should conduct a “call-back” verification to the source (e.g., vendor, company, etc.). Employees should be instructed not to use numbers provided by the person making the delivery, instead, pre-designated numbers should be ready available for proper verification if needed.
4. Have critical facility managers verify status of their physical security safeguards (e.g., lighting, locks, fencing, gates, camera systems, etc.) and have repairs accomplished accordingly.

**E. High Risk Personnel**

1. Determine if there are any visiting dignitaries and/or Very Important People (VIPs). Have the police department coordinate with the dignitary’s/VIP’s Personal Security Officer (PSO) or other appropriate contact. Ensure they are aware of the local threat and obtain/provide emergency contact numbers.
2. Determine if the threat affects local elected officials/dignitaries. If considered at risk, make sure they are aware of local threat and obtain/provide emergency contact numbers.
3. Advise dignitaries/VIPs alter the planned itineraries; limit access

- to their itineraries to a minimum number of trusted sources.
4. Advise dignitaries/VIPs to vary routes and times of travel ensuring they don't establish predictable patterns.
  5. Advise dignitaries/VIPs to keep their vehicle(s) in a secured (e.g., observed, controlled, etc.) location.

### **III. THREAT LEVEL YELLOW – ELEVATED**

#### **A. Threat Awareness**

1. Instruct the Public Information Officer (PIO) to activate a public rumor control phone line for community access. The balance between releasing too little and too much information must be considered.
2. Too little information may be ineffective. Too much information may cause unnecessary panic and generate pandemonium and fear, a principal terrorist objective.
3. Place "key" city/parish department heads (e.g., PIO, Engineering, Public Works, City/Parish Attorney, etc.) on standby status as necessary.
4. Promote and emphasize public use of local "tip line" numbers to report suspicious activities. Properly structured "tip line" promotions can multiply the number of eyes and ears out on the street exponentially. But too much information can cause unnecessary panic/alarm.
5. Verify/validate Threat Level Yellow – Elevated measures and modify accordingly. Review higher threat levels to determine if additional measures are needed.

#### **B. Events/Entertainment**

1. Review event-specific disaster and evacuation maps/plans. Determine if any additional resources are needed for emergency preparedness.
2. Schedule a meeting with major event organizers. Determine adequacy of safety/security measures. Appoint a police liaison Point of Contact (POC) for each event in order to coordinate issues/concerns.
3. Verify major event POC primary/alternate communications. Police and EOC personnel must be able to contact event POC 24-hours a day in case of emergency notification.

#### **C. Transportation/Traffic Control**

1. Once barrier plan has been established, consider prepositioning barrier, signs, lights, etc., near facilities/routes to be blocked. This will aid in quick transition should Threat Level Orange – High or Red - Severe be implemented.

2. Schedule a meeting with major transportation center managers/security directors. Determine adequacy of safety/security measures. Appoint a police liaison Point of Contact (POC) for each major transportation center in order to coordinate issues/concerns.
3. Consider implementing random police traffic checkpoints. Varying locations and times present potential terrorists with a major hurdle in planning an attack: a level of unpredictability in security procedures.
4. Instruct all emergency responders to secure their vehicles when not under their direct control. Reduce the opportunities potential terrorists might gain from obtaining an emergency response vehicle and using it to gain access to sensitive/restricted areas.

**D. Critical Facility Access/Control**

1. Have police conduct periodic facility checks for those facilities determined at risk. Conduct these checks during normal business hours and especially after business hours.
2. For each critical facility identified, advise facility manager/custodian to accomplish external checks of their facilities and parking lots at least once per three-hour interval. Have them report anything out of the ordinary (e.g., abandoned vehicles, unattended packages, loitering personnel, etc.) to the police department.
3. Establish specific block periods (e.g., 9:00 am until 11:00 am, 1:00 pm until 3:00 pm, etc.) in which vendors/contractors are permitted to conduct deliveries at critical facilities. During these periods ensure facility employees are in a position to verify and secure all deliveries. Any attempt to conduct deliveries after established block times should raise suspicions and require close scrutiny and possible police involvement.
4. Advise critical facility manager/custodian to have their emergency generators checked to ensure they are operational and they have plenty of reserve fuel.
5. Advise critical facility manager/custodian to limit access points to single monitored entry. Authorized employees may enter/exit other points as long as the door is secured behind them. Monitoring may be conducted by the physical presence of an employee or by utilizing an existing camera surveillance system. Ensure they secure all unmonitored openings.
6. Have all visitors verified with the office/section to be visited prior to permitting entry/access. General public access must be restricted and “in- house” verification or escorting is essential in enhancing facility security.
7. Initiate searches of all visitor hand carried items being introduced into critical facilities (i.e., something like what is accomplished

at the airport or courthouse daily). It is important to have trained people conducting such searches who know how to identify weapons or explosives. Consider the use of portable “transfriskers” (metal detectors) for search of personnel if appropriate.

**E. High Risk Personnel**

1. After close coordination with visiting VIP’s PSO, determine if additional protective services are needed.
2. Provide periodic police checks, both work and home, for local officials determined to be at risk.
3. Change time and location of staff meetings.
4. Have reserved parking signs/spots removed or covered so as not to attract attention.
5. Change-out personal/official vehicle(s) with less recognizable transport.

**IV. THREAT LEVEL ORANGE - HIGH**

**A. Threat Awareness**

1. Place Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Law Enforcement Operations Center (LEOC) operations on stand-by status.
2. Consider activating a Joint Information Center (JIC). Depending on the circumstances it may be prudent to provide “structured” news releases to the media at scheduled periods.
3. Consider advising City/Parish employees to increase their threat awareness (e.g., what to be looking for, who/how to report their suspicions to, etc.). Solicit the assistance of private, as well as city/parish transportation/utility drivers (e.g., cab/bus drivers, water/gas/electric drivers, garbage truck drivers, etc.) to aid in identifying suspicious activity.
4. Verify/validate Threat Level Guarded and Elevated measures and modify accordingly. Review Threat Level Severe to determine if additional measures are needed.

**B. Events/Entertainment**

1. Consider reducing the hours of the major event(s) and/or altering the announced event schedule. Depending upon the type of event and number of visitors expected, this may provoke media attention and public complaints. But once again, depending upon the type of threat and associated risks, altering the event schedule might be the right step in reducing associated vulnerabilities and causing terrorists to reconsider their plan of attack.
2. Assign major event(s) coordinator to the EOC to assist in emergency actions (e.g., evacuation planning, rapid reaction to issues/questions, etc.).

3. Verify major event Point of Contact (POC) has implemented critical facility access/control countermeasures. Numerous measures under this category will aid in control, identification and isolation associated vulnerabilities. It is imperative all major event POC's are in the notification matrix as countermeasures are implemented/updated.

### **C. Transportation/Traffic Control**

1. Implement barrier plan for facilities considered at risk. The purpose of a barrier plan is to control/divert vehicle traffic away from critical facilities to reduce associated bombing vulnerabilities. Planners should consider grouping critical facilities into "enclaves" in order to aid in controlling areas rather than specific buildings. This is especially important when attempting to prioritize limited resources (e.g., cement barriers, signs, lights, etc.). Traffic engineering and police input is crucial for this measure. Ensure the PIO advises the media of new traffic patterns and of potential traffic bottlenecks.
2. If not already accomplished by implementing a barrier plan, have all vehicles & objects (e.g., dumpsters, garbage cans, vending machines, etc.) moved away from critical facilities. Consider centralized parking and providing shuttle service to critical facilities/major events. The key concept is to reduce bombing opportunities near critical facilities/major events.
3. Increase police patrols/contact with major transportation facilities.
4. Implement identity checks on public/private conveyances (e.g., airlines, buses, cabs, etc.). Ensure employees are trained how to identify alter/forged ID's and who to report their suspicions to.
5. Limit public parking access within enclosed garages. Multi-level public garages are extremely vulnerable to potential car bombers. If closing-off this type of parking garage is considered too much of an impact (versus the risk), consider establishing random vehicle screening/searches (e.g., private security agency, explosive detector dogs, etc.).
6. Consider the advantages of implementing a limited public curfew. Depending on the type of threat, this might be a necessary step in reducing potential terrorist targeting and providing police forces more flexibility in their countermeasures/investigation.

### **D. Critical Facility Access/Control**

1. Limit at risk facility hours. If it is determined the critical facility(s) must remain open, reducing operational hours may at least reduce associated vulnerabilities.
2. Enforce/implement special badging/ID for critical facilities/departments. ID badges vary in equipment technology, tamper sophistication and associated costs. Depending on the

type of threat, time and costs, ID checks could be something as simple as having employees verify driver's licenses to issuing a special type of controlled facility/department badge. No matter what method is chosen, employees must be trained on checking ID's (e.g., how to detect an altered/forged ID card, what actions to take if they suspect an altered/forged ID, etc.) and be consistent in their application of these checks.

3. Coordinate the use of Explosive Detector Dog (EDD) support for selected critical facilities/parking lots. EDD resources will be limited so it will be important to establish priorities. It is imperative to involve police K-9 division experts in the planning process. EDD's have restrictions on where, how and when they can be used and experienced handlers can help planners use them where they will be most effective.
4. Have all deliveries and mail being introduced into critical facilities scanned for explosives. This can be accomplished by having trained employees conducting inspection of everything being introduced into the facility and recognizing/reporting suspicious packages (e.g., no return or unusual address, unusual shape/weight, oil residue, etc.). Depending upon available resources, this could also include the use of EDD's, X-ray machines, Ionscans, metal detectors, etc.
5. Advise all critical facility managers to secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms and storage areas not in regular use. Continue to limit facility access points to single monitored entry.
6. Require all visitors be physically escorted while in/around facility. Log all visitors on a central register and provide a visitor badge as appropriate. Ensure all visitor badges are turned in and accounted for upon departure. Continue to verify all visitors with office/section to be visited prior to allowing entry.
7. Initiate searches of all hand carried items being introduced into critical facilities. Do not limit searches to visitors only; this procedure should be implemented for all who enter the facility in order to counter potential "insider threats".

#### **E. High Risk Personnel**

1. Request cancellation of dignitary/VIP visit if feasible. If the visit cannot be cancelled, close coordination with the dignitary/VIP Personal Security Officer (PSO) is essential.
2. If not already accomplished, assign an armed PSO for local/visiting dignitary considered at risk. Provide body armor if appropriate.
3. Limit public appearances. Dignitaries must be informed their safety is inherently at risk at such an elevated threat level. If they must move about on official business, they should do so discretely, unannounced or otherwise publicized, and on an



extremely limited basis. Police resources will e already stretched to their maximum capacity and must be considered when permitting dignitary/VIP travel.

4. If the dignitary/VIP must travel, attempt to secure their route of travel. Consider securing alternate routes of travel as well. If there are insufficient resources available to physically secure the route (e.g., posting of police officers, security guards, other employees), sanitize the route by conducting route sweeps (e.g., use of EDD's), patrolling, use of close circuit television {CCTV}, etc.).
5. Use EDD's to conduct sweeps of dignitary/VIP vehicles. If unavailable, designate a trained person to conduct such a vehicle inspection. Once the vehicle has been sanitized, ensure it is physically monitored. If there are any interruptions in monitoring, a new search must be conducted.
6. 6. Screen/search all dignitary/VIP mail/deliveries.

## **V. THREAT LEVEL RED - SEVERE**

### **A. Threat Awareness**

1. Activate the Emergency Alert System (EAS) as appropriate to warn general public to stay clear of the immediate threat area, as needed.
2. Activate First Call Telephone Warning System to aid in the immediate evacuation of targeted facility/location, as needed.
3. Coordinate public warning and information with local news media outlets.

### **B. Events/Entertainment**

1. Cancel major event(s).

### **C. Transportation/Traffic Control**

1. Provide law enforcement for selected locations affected by the barrier plan. Under Threat Level Severe, the threat is imminent or is actually occurring in the local area.
2. Cancel all public transportation until lower Threat Level is implemented.
3. Terminate parking in enclosed garages or ones adjacent to critical facilities. Multi-level public garages are extremely vulnerable to potential car bombers.
4. Have all citizens remain indoors until lower Threat Level is implemented. Though it is impractical think it possible to get the word to everyone to stay indoors and to stay clear of high-threat areas, reducing the number of innocent bystanders will aid police forces in reacting to specific threats and reduce potential civilian casualties.



**D. Critical Facility Access/Control**

1. Close at risk facilities.
2. If facility/department must remain open, use authenticated authorization listings to verify against ID for entry control. Critical facility managers must determine who must have access to facility/department during such extreme circumstances and have their names (and other identifying information) alphabetically listed to facilitate controlled entry. Employees should use this document in conjunction with the requester's ID card to verify authority to enter.
3. If all personnel have not been instructed to stay indoors, instruct all critical facility managers/custodians to conduct external facility checks at least once per hour.
4. Do not accept any deliveries/mail until the Threat Level is reduced; the risk is too high.
5. Terminate all visitation and general public access until lower Threat Level is reduced. Even if increased measures have been announced, there will still be some persons who have not gotten the word. Facility managers must be instructed to lock their doors and post signs indicating they are closed.
6. Do not allow any visitor to bring hand carried items into the facility.

**E. High Risk Personnel**

1. Terminate all traveling of visiting dignitary/VIPs until Threat Level is reduced.
2. Terminate all traveling of local public officials/VIPs. Have them remain in a protective location until the Threat Level is reduced.
3. Cancel all public appearances.

## Appendix 2 – Attachment 5 – Threat Level Matrix

**Table 1: Threat Awareness**

<b>BLUE – GUARDED</b>	<b>YELLOW – ELEVATED</b>	<b>ORANGE – HIGH</b>	<b>RED – SEVERE</b>
Determine CRIMCO and COMCO requirements	PIO may activate a public rumor control phone line	Stand-by 24-hour EOC & LEOC operations	Activate 24-hour EOC and LEOC operations
Law Enforcement agencies will determine “releasable” information and advise Caddo OHSEP	Place “key” city/parish department heads on standby status as necessary	Stand-by Joint Information Center (JIC)	Activate the EAS to warn general public to stay clear of immediate threat area until lower threat Level is established
Determine local Law Enforcement issues/concerns based on threat; discuss local countermeasures	Encourage public use of local “tip line” numbers to report suspicious activities	Increase threat awareness and reporting through local sources	Activate “First Call” to aid in the immediate evacuation of any targeted facility/location, as needed
Review higher Threat Levels	Verify lower threat measures and modify accordingly; review higher Threat Levels	Verify lower Threat Level measures and modify accordingly; review higher Threat Levels	Coordinate public information with local news media

**Table 2: Events/ Entertainment**

<b>BLUE – GUARDED</b>	<b>YELLOW – ELEVATED</b>	<b>ORANGE – HIGH</b>	<b>RED – SEVERE</b>
Determine on-going major events and discuss countermeasures	Review event-specific disaster and evacuation maps/plans	Reduce event hours; alter announced schedule	Cancel event
Obtain 24 hr contact point for any major event	Schedule meeting with major event organizers; appoint a police liaison POC for each event	Assign major event coordinator to the EOC	

	Verify communication with event POC	Verify major event POC has implemented critical facility access/control countermeasures
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**Table 3: Transportation/Traffic Control**

<b>BLUE – GUARDED</b>	<b>YELLOW – ELEVATED</b>	<b>ORANGE – HIGH</b>	<b>RED – SEVERE</b>
Review/discuss barrier plan for reducing vulnerabilities for selected critical facilities	Preposition barriers near facilities/routes to be blocked	Implement barrier plan for facilities considered at risk; ensure PIO advises media of impact on traffic flow	Provide police enforcement for selected locations affected by barrier plan
Ensure all major transportation facilities are notified of security issues/concerns	Schedule a meeting with major transportation center mngrs/sec dir; appoint police liaison POC	Move cars & objects away from facilities considered at risk; consider centralized parking	Cancel all public transportation until lower Threat Level is implemented
	Consider implementing random police traffic checkpoints	Increase police patrols/contact with major transportation facilities	Terminate parking in all enclosed garages and adjacent to critical facilities
	All emergency responder vehicles will be secured when not under the direct control of the operator	Implement ID checks on public/private conveyance	Have all citizens remain indoors until lower Threat Level is implemented
		Limit public parking access in enclosed garages; conduct random vehicle searches Consider limited public curfew	

**Table 4: Critical Facility Access/Control**

<b>BLUE – GUARDED</b>	<b>YELLOW- ELEVATED</b>	<b>ORANGE – HIGH</b>	<b>RED – SEVERE</b>
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Identify which facilities are considered at risk	Have police conduct periodic facility checks (business and non-business hours)	Limit at risk facility hours	Close at risk facilities
Advise facility mngr/custodian to conduct random external facility checks	Advise facility mngr/custodian to conduct external facility checks at least once per three-three hour interval	Enforce special badging/ID for critical facilities/departments	Use authenticated authorization listing to verify against ID for entry control
Have all deliveries verified outside facility	Require all deliveries to be delivered at specific block times	Coordinate explosive detector dog support for selected critical facilities/parking lots	Advise building mngr/custodian to conduct external facility checks at least once per hour
Verify status of physical security aids; repair vulnerabilities immediately	Ensure critical facility emergency generators are operational and have plenty of fuel	Have all deliveries and mail scanned for explosives	Do not accept any deliveries/mail until Threat Level is reduced
	Advise "at risk facility" mngr/custodian to limit access points to single monitored entry; secure all unmonitored openings	Secure & regularly inspect all bldgs., rooms and storage areas not in regular use	Terminate all visitation and general public access until Threat Level is reduced
	Verify all visitors with office/section to be visited before permitting entry/access	Require all visitors to be physically escorted in/around critical facilities	Do not allow visitors to bring hand carried items into facility
	Initiate searches of all visitor hand carried items being introduced into critical facility	Initiate searches of ALL hand carried items being introduced into facility	

**Table 5: High Risk Personnel**

<b>BLUE – GUARDED</b>	<b>YELLOW – ELEVATED</b>	<b>ORANGE – HIGH</b>	<b>RED – SEVERE</b>
Determine if there are any visiting dignitaries/VIPs; coordinate with their personal security officer	Determine if additional protective services are needed	Request cancellation of dignitary/VIP visit	Terminate all traveling of visiting dignitary/VIPs until Threat Level is reduced
Determine if threat affects local officials	Provide periodic police checks at work and residence	Assign an armed PSO for 24 hr protection as warranted; provide body armor	Terminate all traveling; remain in protective custody until Threat Level is reduced
Alter planned itineraries; limit access to itineraries to minimal number of trusted sources	Change time of location of staff meetings	Limit public appearances	Cancel public appearances
Vary routes and times of travel	Remove reserved parking signs/spots	Secure/sanitize dignitary/VIP travel route	
Keep dignitary/VIP transport in secured location	Change out of personal/official vehicle(s) with less recognizable transport	Have all dignitary/VIP transport swept/sanitized for explosives Screen/search all mail/deliveries for dignitary/VIP	

## Appendix 2 – Attachment 6 – Federal and State Assistance

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### **I. FEDERAL ASSISTANCE**

- a. Emergency/Releases/Threats/Chem-Biological Hotline**  
1-800-424-8802
- b. Non-Emergency/Planning/Info/Chem-Biological Helpline**  
1-800-368-6499
- c. Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
Shreveport Office: 221-8439  
New Orleans Office: 1-504-522-4671
- d. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms**  
Shreveport Office: 676-3301
- e. Barksdale Air Force Base**  
2ND Bomb Wing Command Post: 456-2151

### **II. STATE ASSISTANCE**

- a. Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness**  
1-225-925-7500
- b. Louisiana Office of Public Health (NW Region VII)**  
Shreveport Office: 676-7470
- c. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality**  
Shreveport Office: 676-7476  
Baton Rouge: 1-225-219-3640
- d. Louisiana Office of State Police**  
Troop G – Bossier City: 741-7411
- e. National Guard**  
Contact Caddo OHSEP at 675-2255 (24 Hours)

## Appendix 2 – Attachment 7 – Abbreviations/Definitions

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ATF	Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
CRIMCO	The Crisis Management Component is comprised of intelligence and law enforcement community to support and address crime issues and support the on-scene response organizations. A LEOC will be established for CRIMCO.
COMCO	The Consequence Management Component is comprised of the Incident Command Staff and response personnel on scene.
Critical Facility	Key infrastructure (public and private) which if damaged could impact the delivery of vital services to the public or disrupt government operations.
EOC	Emergency Operations Center. See Annex A to the Basic Plan – Direction and Control. The EOC is the key to successful response and recovery operations. With decision-makers located together, personnel and other resources can be used more efficiently. Coordination of activities will ensure that all tasks are accomplished with little or no duplication of effort.
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation – A division of the U.S. Dept. of Justice charged with investigating all violations of federal law except those specifically assigned to other federal agencies. The FBI investigates terrorism, espionage, sabotage, kidnapping, bank robbery, civil-rights violations, and fraud against the government, and conducts security clearances.
JOC	Joint Operation Center is established by federal authorities and may absorb the LEOC.
LEOC	Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness.
LSP	Louisiana State Police
POC	Point of Contact
PSO	Personal Security Officer. A law enforcement officer or military specialist with specialized training in the protection of VIPs or otherwise high-risk targets. Often assigned for VIP protection and coordination of VIP's security requirements.
TIP	The Terrorist Incident Program designed to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover from a terrorist incident.

## Appendix 3 – Temporary Pass (Available at Caddo Parish OHSEP)

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<b>ID</b>	<b>TAG</b>	
DATE	TIME-IN	TIME-OUT
NAME		
RESIDENCE		
MISSION		
LIMITATIONS		
#		
<b>RESIDENT</b>		
#		
<b>PRESS</b>		
#		
<b>RESCUE</b>		
#		
<b>OFFICIAL</b>		



## Appendix 4 – Local Law Enforcement Agencies

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### **I. MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS**

**A. Blanchard Police Dept.**

314 Alexander Avenue  
Blanchard, LA 71009  
929-3700

**B. Greenwood Police Dept.**

9395 Greenwood Drive  
Greenwood, LA 71033  
938-5554

**C. Mooringsport Police Dept.**

P.O. Box 9  
Mooringsport, LA 71061  
996-7661

**D. Oil City Police Dept.**

202 Allen Street  
Oil City, LA 71061  
995-6681

**E. Shreveport Police Dept.**

1234 Texas Avenue  
Shreveport, LA 71101  
673-7300

**F. Vivian Police Dept.**

121 North Pine  
Vivian, LA 71082  
(318) 375-2914

### **II. PARISH SHERIFF'S OFFICE**

**Caddo Sheriff's Office**

501 Texas Avenue  
Shreveport, LA 71101  
675-2170

### **III. STATE POLICE**

**LOUISIANA STATE POLICE TROOP "G" BOSSIER CITY**

5300 Industrial Drive  
Bossier City, LA 71112  
741-7411

#### **IV. NATIONAL GUARD**

NOTE: All requests for National Guard assistance must go through the Caddo Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 675-2255 (24 hours).

##### **A. 1/156 ARMOR HEADQUARTERS FORT HUMBUG**

400 E. Stoner Avenue  
Shreveport, LA 71101  
676-7613

##### **B. 165<sup>TH</sup> TRANSPORTATION BATTALION**

4527 Military Drive  
Bossier City, LA 71111  
741-7468

#### **V. FEDERAL AGENCIES**

##### **A. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF)**

401 Edwards Street  
Shreveport, LA 71101  
676-3301

##### **B. Barksdale Air Force Base (BAFB)**

BAFB, LA 71110  
Base Operator: 456-2252  
Public Affairs: 456-3065

##### **C. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)**

401 Edwards Street  
Shreveport, LA 71101  
676-4080

##### **D. Federal Bureau Of Investigation (FBI)**

401 Edwards Street  
Shreveport, LA 71101  
221-8439

##### **E. U.S. Marshall's Office**

300 Fannin Street  
Shreveport, LA 71101  
676-4200

## Appendix 5 – Law Enforcement Resources

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Critical Data Forms (CDF) and Critical Facility Forms (CFF) are kept on file and computer database at the Caddo Emergency Operations Center (EOC). These forms contain listings for all available key governmental and private sector resources in Caddo Parish. The forms also list mutual-aid assistance available from surrounding parishes/counties and state and federal agencies as well. Information from the resource lists may be obtained by contacting Caddo OHSEP at 675-2255 (24 hours).

### **I. PARISH PUBLIC SAFETY RESOURCES:**

1. Attachment 1: Sheriff Department Facilities: on file in EOC
2. Attachment 2: Sheriff Department Personnel: on file in EOC
3. Attachment 3: Sheriff Department Equipment: on file in EOC
4. Attachment 4: Sheriff Department Auxiliary List: on file in EOC

### **II. MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SAFETY RESOURCES: (LIST BY CITY AND TOWN)**

1. Attachment 1: Police Department Facilities: on file in EOC
2. Attachment 2: Police Department Personnel: on file in EOC
3. Attachment 3: Police Department Equipment: on file in EOC
4. Attachment 4: Police Department Auxiliary List: on file in EOC

### **III. PRIVATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS: (LIST BY ORGANIZATION)**

1. Attachment 1: Facilities: on file in EOC
2. Attachment 2: Personnel: on file in EOC
3. Attachment 3: Equipment: on file in EOC

## Appendix 6 – Civil Disturbances

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### **I. GENERAL**

Whether threatened or actual, law enforcement agencies must respond to reports of civil disturbance. For purposes of emergency planning, a civil disturbance involves a crowd (group of people beyond the immediate control of normal police response to a fight call). The crowd may be organized, as in a strike or demonstration situation; or uncontrolled, as in a mob or riot situation.

### **II. RESPONSE PROCEDURES**

Response to civil disturbances is the responsibility of law enforcement agencies. Support may be needed for other governmental units such as the fire department (disbursing people with streams of water), the public works department (barricades and other support), and emergency medical services (for treatment and transportation of injured officers and/or citizens). Mass transportation support may be needed to take arrested demonstrators to an incarceration site. Other local resources may also be needed, depending on how the incident is managed.

If the situation is beyond the management capability of local law enforcement, support should be requested from law enforcement agencies in surrounding jurisdictions. If those resources are still not enough, it may be necessary to request assistance from state government—State Police and/or National Guard.

Response procedures will depend on the particular circumstances of each incident; however, the following initial response actions should be performed:

1. Dispatch law enforcement unit to assess situation. (It might be helpful to observe the area from the air.)
2. Advise officer-in-charge of situation. Officer-in-charge will notify chief of police or sheriff, who will designate other officials to be notified.
3. Establish perimeter around site.
4. Identify staging areas and secure it.
5. Equip and brief officers, transport to staging area.
6. Alert/request support resources as needed.
7. Activate Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

### **III. POLICE LINES—CROWD CONTROL—TRAFFIC CONTROL**

#### **A. Police Lines**

Police lines must be established without delay. The purpose is to seal off the area so that persons, vehicles and equipment that may interfere with operations may effectively be excluded from the scene.

At a large-scale emergency, it is usually necessary to establish a double set of lines:

**1. Inner Perimeter of Security Area**

This area shall include only the immediate disaster area. All but essential personnel and equipment shall be excluded.

**2. Outer Perimeter**

- a. The outer perimeter will include the entire area affected by arriving personnel and equipment and the area within which the various operational units will be established, such as: command post, temporary morgue, first-aid station, staging area, media, parking, etc.
- b. This outer perimeter line will be considered the actual police line. It should be established in accordance with requirements for the traffic and pedestrian control.
- c. The perimeter line should also be established so as to minimize the need for barriers and in addition, persons and vehicles may be dispersed in several directions.
- d. Insofar as possible, only one well-policed entrance or checkpoint should be allowed where the emergency route intersects the line. If necessary, a second entrance through the line may be maintained on the opposite side of the perimeter to facilitate the entry and/or departure of emergency personnel and equipment. Personnel and equipment arriving at the entrance check point will be directed to the Staging Area or other designated location.
- e. Personnel maintaining police lines will exclude unauthorized persons, and will direct authorized personnel and equipment to the entrance checkpoint. However, emergency personnel and equipment shall not be delayed or re-routed. Emergency personnel and equipment shall be allowed through the lines at any point and directed to the scene.

**3. Barriers**

- a. A limited number of barriers are available at police headquarters.
- b. Additional barriers may be obtained from city, parish or state highway departments.
- c. By indicating police lines to be established on a precinct area map, a rough estimate may be made of the number of barriers needed, also, the location where they are to be delivered.

**4. Persons Permitted Through Police Lines**

The following persons shall be permitted through police lines:

- a. Chief elected official of the affected jurisdiction, or their designee.
- b. Other government officials (if connected with the emergency).
- c. Members of law enforcement, fire service, buildings, health unit, etc. - in performance of emergency duties.
- d. Employees with public and private utilities.
- e. Representatives with FAA, NTSB, airport authority and airline company - if aircraft accident.
- f. Other agencies as deemed necessary by the Incident Commander.

- g. All news media personnel should be directed to public information officers and the on-site press briefing area.

## **5. Vehicles Permitted Through Police Lines**

Law enforcement personnel shall admit only the following vehicles through the lines:

- a. City or parish executives' vehicle or their representatives' vehicles.
- b. Police and fire department vehicles.
- c. Ambulances.
- d. Equipment vehicles to be used in connection with the emergency.
- e. Vehicles of public and private utilities.
- f. Public works/highway department vehicles and related equipment.
- g. Private sector response and/or heavy equipment, if requested for the emergency.
- h. Other vehicles/equipment as authorized by the Incident Commander.

## **B. Crowd Control**

At any emergency or disaster scene there is a tendency for large crowds to collect. This creates an additional problem and necessitates the assignment of numerous personnel to control the situation. The danger of additional injuries, hysteria, panic, interference with operations, and possibly looting exist if large crowds are permitted to develop. To prevent this condition from developing, the following activities should be performed:

### **1. Frozen Area**

- a. Establish police lines immediately.
- b. Remove all unauthorized persons from the area.
- c. Allow only authorized personnel to enter area.
- d. Restrict entry into area to one or two points through police lines.
- e. Assign a law enforcement officer(s) at entry point(s) to check identity.
- f. The commanding officer shall keep officer(s) assigned to the check point(s) and keep them informed as to the locations of the various phases of the operation so that they may direct authorized persons intelligently to the various locations and prevent wandering in the area.
- g. If there are any locations within the lines where a large number of persons are gathered, schools, churches, theatres, etc., but where there is no immediate danger, dismissals shall be delayed until arrangements can be made for orderly evacuation.

### **2. Realignment of Barriers**

Persons crowding against barriers constitute an additional problem. A large crowd may become unruly when its movement is restricted and the area becomes too congested. The member of the law enforcement agency in charge at an area where large crowds are beginning to form must realize the necessity of either dispersing or dividing the crowd into smaller groups before the congestion becomes unmanageable. Barriers may be realigned or an

additional police line may be formed far enough away to correct the condition.

If it becomes necessary, because of conditions at the scene, to move the police line further to the rear, a new line of barriers should be set up in the rear prior to moving crowds back. When the new line is established, the existing barriers shall not be moved until the crowd has been relocated behind the new line.

### **3. Shut-Off Lines**

Shut-off lines may also be established in the rear of existing lines to further regulate the formation of crowds. In all cases, at the scene of an emergency or disaster, the public must be kept a sufficient distance from the scene to prevent their interference with operations and also to protect them from any potential dangers such as an explosion, building wall collapse, or drifting gases.

### **C. Traffic Control**

Traffic control should address the establishment of perimeters at disaster scenes. Police lines must be erected immediately for several purposes:

1. To protect the scene from an evidential standpoint.
2. To keep the public out of the way of emergency vehicles.
3. To maintain access for response vehicles.

## **IV. SUMMARY**

Local law enforcement agencies will maintain more detailed standard operating guidelines (SOGs) for response to civil disturbances than are included in this appendix. Law enforcement SOGs should use a format that will make it easy to find the information and guidance needed. There should be no confusion about coordinating the initial response. Directions should be very clear, even to someone not familiar with normal response to this type of emergency. Response plans should be kept simple, remembering that immediate concerns are the initial response steps and those elements that should not be overlooked during the response.

Law enforcement agencies should also consider videotaping civil disturbances; videotapes can be used for identification purposes as well as evidence in criminal proceedings. Whether or not videotaping is done, a careful written record should be made of all aspects of the incident.

## Appendix 7 – Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs)

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Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) for departments/agencies/organizations listed in this annex will be developed by the respective units listed herein and should be submitted to Caddo OHSEP for reference at the Caddo Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Updates should be forwarded to Caddo OHSEP on a routine basis.